We use the formal language LOTOS to specify a registration protocol between a user and a T rusted Third Party, that requires mutual authentication. We explain how a model-based veri cation method can be used to verify its robustness to attacks by a n i n truder. This method is also used to nd a simpler protocol that remains secure.
INTRODUCTION
With the development o f the Internet and especially with the birth of electronic commerce, the security o f c o m m unications between computers becomes a crucial point. All these new applications require reliable protocols able to perform secure transactions. The environment of these operations is very hostile because no transmission channel can be considered safe. Formal descriptions and veri cations can be used to obtain the assurance that a protocol cannot be threatened by a n i n truder.
In this paper, we will show that it is possible to make a formal veri cation of a security protocol. We can certify that an intruder cannot break a protocol with di erent kinds of attacks. We will also show how the verication process is able to give useful information to correct the protocol if necessary. T h e v eri cation technique we h a ve d e v eloped is based on the LO-TOS (Bolognesi et al. 1987 )(ISO8807 1989 language and the CADP package (Fernandez et al. 1996) included in the Eucalyptus toolbox (Garavel 1996) . We use a model-based approach that, until recently, w as not felt adequate to tackle the veri cation of security protocols (Leduc et al. 1996) (Lowe 1996) .
We will illustrate the method on a registration protocol. The Equicrypt protocol (Lacroix et al. 1996 ) is a conditional access protocol under design in the European ACTS OKAPI project (Guimaraes et al. 1996) . It allows a user to subscribe to multimedia services such as video on demand. Equicrypt is an open protocol where the user must rst register with a T rusted Third Party (TTP) using a challenge-response exchange. After a successful registration, this third party issues a public-key certi cate which a l l o ws the user to subscribe to a service with di erent service providers. The subscription part has been studied in (Leduc et al. 1996) and some possible attacks have b e e n reported. In this paper, we will focus on the design and veri cation of the registration protocol which must provide the authentication of the user by the TTP and authentication of the TTP by the user. The protocol is also used to transmit the user's public key to the TTP.
The paper is organized as follow. The section 2 describes the registration protocol that we w ant t o v erify and possibly correct. In section 3 we p r e s e n t the formal speci cation of the protocol written in LOTOS and the section 4 is dedicated to the properties we want to verify. The veri cation itself is explained in section 5 and concludes this paper.
THE REGISTRATION PROTOCOL

Notation
The protocol involves several cryptographic operations, for which w e give a n abstract view only. Each s c heme uses peer encryption and decryption keys K E and K D and functions E( ) a n d D( ) s u c h t h a t D(K D E (K E m )) = m for any message m. In public key cryptography, the encryption key is the public key and the decryption key is the private key for ciphering operations. For signature operations, the encryption key is the private key and the decryption key is the public key. W e also use the more compact notation fmgK E to denote the message m encrypted with the key K E . That is fmgK E = E(K E m ).
K P
A denotes the public key of the user A and K S A the private secret key of the user A. The expression fmgK E where K E is a public key represents the message m encrypted with the key K E . The same expression where K E is a private key represents both the message m in clear and a hash of the message m encrypted with the key K E .
We widely use the concept of nonce (i.e. a number used only once). A n o n c e i s a r a n d o m n umberthatmust be used during only one instance of the protocol. This prevents an intruder from replaying outdated messages and is an abstract model of the pair \time stamps, random number".
All the messages have the following structure :
Number : Source ! Destination : Message Id < Message Fields > The registration protocol 3
Principles
The following is a presentation of the Equicrypt system and its registration protocol. The aim of the Equicrypt system is to control the access to multimedia services proposed by service providers. To avoid requiring di erent access systems for every service provider, a unique decoder uses a public-key cryptography protocol to subscribe to and decode di erent services. An independent e n tity known as the Trusted Third Party (TTP) acts as a registering authority trusted by both users and providers. The registration protocol must achieve t h e m utual authentication of the user and the TTP. The TTP must be sure that the claimed identity of the user is the right one and the user must be sure that it registers with the right T T P . The TTP must also receive the good user's public-key to issue a public-key certi cate similar to X.509 certi cates (ITU-T X.509 1993). This kind of certi cate is the user's public key signed with the TTP's private key. The authentication of the user by the TTP uses the Guillou-Quisquater zero-knowledge identi cation scheme (Guillou et al. 1988) . When the user buys his decoder, he receives secret personal credentials derived from its reallife identity. These credentials will help the user to prove who he is. The goal of the Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) algorithm is to convince the TTP that the user has valid credentials without revealing them. The authentication of the TTP by the user uses a challenge based on a nonce similar to the 3-way a u t h e ntication protocol (Schneier 1996) . When the user receives his credentials, he also receives the TTP's public-key that will allow him to perform the required checks on the messages and to authenticate the TTP.
The transmission of the user's public key is the third purpose of the registration protocol. The TTP must be sure that the received public key is really the user's one. He must make a link between the user's identity and his public key. An improved version of GQ algorithm proposed in Lacroix et al. (1996) can be used to check this.
The Guillou-Quisquater identi cation scheme
The cryptographic details of the GQ algorithm are beyond the scope of this paper but the principles will be exposed. Basically, the credentials the user receives are mathematically related to its identity. Let the user act as the prover P and the TTP act as the veri er V in the following protocol.
The prover generates a random numberr and computes a function T of this number and of his public key. He sends the veri er his identity I D , his public key K P P and the result of the function T. As a response, the veri er sends back another random numberd. Then the prover computes a function t with the two random numbers r and d and his credentials B and sends it to the veri er.
When he receives the response, the veri er can check that the credentials used to compute t correspond to the identity claimed in the rst message, thanks to the existing mathematical relationship between I Dand B. The user's credentials B must be kept secret so that the only one who could have computed a right function t is the real user. Thus the TTP has obviously received a fresh response from the right user and has authenticated him.
In message 1, the user's public key has also been scrambled (by the function T) with the random numberr. W h e n t h e v eri er received message 3, he gains the mathematical ability t o c heck that the public key received in message 1 is also the one used to compute T. Although the public key is transmitted in clear in message 1 and is thus known to an intruder, this intruder cannot forge a f a k e message 1 with another public key. T h i s i s b e c a u s e h e d o e s n o t k n o w the random number r used again in message 3 and so he cannot generate a valid function T(K P P r ).
Abstract model of the Guillou-Quisquater algorithm
In fact, the GQ algorithm can be seen as a general encryption/decryption scheme. This will be very useful for our formal description. We can consider the user's identity together with its public key as a public decryption key and the credentials as a corresponding secret encryption key. Then, the GQ algorithm looks like a n a u t h e n tication scheme based on a nonce and works as follows. The prover sends his decryption key and receives back the random number d from the veri er. The random number d acts as the nonce. Then he encrypts it with his encryption key. T h e v eri er can check that the nonce he sent has a good signature. This scheme resists to the \man-in-the-middle" attack because the decryption key is mathematically linked to the prover's identity : the identity itself being a part of the decryption key. When this authentication scheme is used with the classical public key cryptography, not the GQ algorithm, the veri er must receive the prover's public key in another way b y a secure channel.
The real algorithm also involves the random numberr. As said previously, its main purpose is to scramble the user's public key in the function T. If the intruder generates such a fake function in the rst message, the credentials computation performed by the veri er when he receives the third message will fail. We will obtain the same result if the intruder changes the user's public key. T h i s behaviour is exactly transposed in our model because both the user's identity and its public key are used to check the credentials. The second purpose of r is to prevent the TTP from guessing B. Our speci cation does not take these cryptographic attacks into account. Thus we do not need to consider the random numberr and we can ignore it in our model. To a void confusion, we use the special notation F(B d) to express the encryption of the nonce d with the credentials B. This will help the reader to keep the modelling in mind.
Protocol description
The complete registration protocol is as follows. The protocol comprises the authenti cation of the user by the TTP with the GQ algorithm. We have added the authent i c a t i o n o f t h e T T P b y the user with a challenge based on a nonce. Finally, w e h a ve added a fourth message to carry the registration result and we use the abstraction of the GQ identi cation scheme depicted above. This rst version of the protocol has a aw. We will see in section 5 that the formal veri cation has revealed it and has given information to correct the protocol and to produce new versions.
(a) Initial knowledge of the user An identity : U s e r I D . A pair of public/private keys : K P U and K S U .
Credentials : B.
The public parameters of the GQ algorithm.
The public key of the TTP : K P T T P .
(b) Initial knowledge of the TTP A pair of public/private keys : K P T T P and K S T T P . The public parameters of the GQ algorithm.
(c) Message exchanges
The user generates a random nonce n and sends the message 1.
1 : User ! T T P : Register Request <UserID K P U fngK P T T P > When the TTP receives message 1, he decrypts the nonce n and signs it, generates a random number d and sends them to the user. The TTP can handle several registrations at a time. So he maintains an internal table with one entry for each user who has a registration in progress and he records the tuple < U s e r I D K P U n d > .
2 : T T P ! U s e r : Register Challenge < d fngK S T T P > When the user receives message 2, he checks the signature. If the signature is correct, he performs the GQ calculation and sends the result to the TTP. The LOTOS speci cation models both the authentication system and the environment. The authentication system is composed of the user, the TTP and the intruder. Figure 1 shows the general structure of the processes and their interaction points. The communication channel between the user and the TTP is replaced by the intruder. He intercepts all messages and transmits them or not, with or without modi cation. We g i v e more details about the intruder in section 3.3. Gates UsndTTP and UrcvTTP are used by the user for its communication in both directions. The TTP uses the gates TTPsndU and TTPrcvU.
The environment is responsible for the management of speci c events. Firstly, h e p l a ys the role of the real user who asks his decoder to register with an interaction at the gate AUTH. Secondly, he receives messages that give i n f o rmation about the internal state of the user and about the internal state of the TTP. These messages will help us to perform the formal veri cation. In this paper, we call them the special events. We h a ve de ned six of them received through the gate SYSTEM_STATE :
1 : User ! Environment : US E RSTART REG < U s e r I D > This message noti es the environment that the user whose identity i s UserID has received the order to register. The user generates this message before sending a valid registration request to the TTP. In our speci cation, the user and the TTP always behave correctly.
2 : T T P ! E n v i r o n m e n t: T T P START REG < U s e r I D > With this message, the TTP informs the environment that he has received a valid registration request from the user who claims that his identity i s U s e r I D .
: T T P ! E n v i r o n m e n t: T T P REG S UCCE E D E D<UserID K>
When the TTP sends this message, this means that he has successfully registered the user U s e r I D with the public key K. This message occurs when the TTP owns a valid response to his GQ veri cation. He will then send a message 4 + .
: T T P ! E n v i r o n m e n t: T T P REG F A I L E D < U s e r I D K >
This message corresponds to the previous one but when the GQ veri cation has failed. The TTP will send a message 4 ; .
: User ! Environment : US E RREG S UCCE E D E D< U s e r I D >
The user informs the environment he has received a valid successful registration acknowledgement from the TTP. The user informs the environment that he has received a valid refused registration acknowledgement from the TTP. That is, the user has received a message 4 ; where the TTP's signature is valid but his response is negative. Finally, the third task of the environment is to receive error messages. The user and the TTP perform several checks when they receive a message. If one of these checks fails, a message indicating the reason of the error is generated. It is very important to understand the di erence between the two kinds of interruptions a registration can encounter. The registration can fail because the TTP has decided that the user does not own good credentials. That is what we will call a failure. The other cases are errors. An error occurs when the registration protocol stops due to a badly formed message : wrong signature, wrong nonce, ... We obviously focus on failures because we want to defeat the intruder when he generates good messages. An intruder can always create errors by sending garbage in the transmission channel. Figure 2 sketches the main behaviours of the user and the TTP. Each transition is labelled with the transmission of a message, the reception of a message or the generation of a special event. Error cases and data manipulation are not shown for simplicity.
Data types
This speci cation has been written using data type language extensions, as o ered by the APERO tools (Pecheur 1996) included in the Eucalyptus toolbox. The original text has to be processed by t h e A P E R O translator to get a v alid LOTOS speci cation. This provides for a smaller and more readable speci cation.
The abstract data types are composed of :
Base values : identi ers, keys, credentials described as explicit enumerations. Set of values : They are specially used to model the knowledge of the intruder. For example, to form a message, the intruder will pick a v alue in each of his sets non determinatically. Tables : Needed for storing information about registrations. The TTP can manage several registrations simultaneously so he must store the values received in the messages to make the authentication.
The Intruder
The intruder replaces the channel between the user and the provider. We w ant him to mimic any attack a real-world intruder can realize. Thus our intruder mu s t b e a b l e t o : Eavesdrop on and/or intercept any message exchanged among the entities. Decrypt parts of messages that are encrypted with his own public key and store them. Introduce fake messages in the system. A fake message is an old message replayed or a new one built up from components of old messages including components he was unable to decrypt.
The LOTOS process that models the intruder is always ready to interact at the four gates UsndTTP, TTPsndU, UrcvTTP and TTPrcvU. When the user, respectively the TTP, sends a message to the gate UsndTTP, respectively TTPsndU, the intruder catches the message and tries to decrypt its encrypted parts. Then he stores each part of the message in separate sets of values. These sets constitute the intruder's knowledge base that increases each time a message is received. When the user, respectively the TTP, expects a message on the gate UrcvTTP, respectively TTPrcvU, the intruder builds a new message with values stored in his sets. With this method, the intruder tries every message it can create.
The intruder is parameterized with some initial knowledge which g i v es him a certain amount o f p o wer. This power includes the capabilities to act as a user with the real TTP and to act as a TTP with the real user. Thus the intruder ow n s a v alid identity, v alid credentials and a valid pair of public/private keys. To give t h e i n truder the capability of generating nonces, his initial knowledge also contains nonces that are distinct from those used by the entities. The system we modelled only includes one real user and one real TTP. W i t h h i s knowledge, the intruder can be seen as a second user and a second TTP. S o , our speci cation incorporates the case where a second valid user tries to cheat and the case where a second valid TTP tries to catch the registration.
The initial knowledge of the intruder is as follows :
An identity : IntruderID. The identity of the user : U s e r I D . A pair of public/private keys : K P I et K S I .
Valid credentials : B I .
The public key of the user K P U and the public key of the TTP K P T T P . Nonces. We assume that our intruder cannot break the public key cryptosystem. That is, he cannot get a message in clear from an encrypted message and he cannot forge a signature without the private key. Note that LOTOS easily provides processes that transgress this rule. Care must be taken to avoid these kinds of unrealistic behaviours. A more detailed description of the intruder can be found in Germeau et al. (1997) 
Labelled Transition System
To gain con dence into the speci cation, it has been simulated with the XSimulator tool from the Eucalyptus toolbox in step-by-step execution mode. This allows us to get a LOTOS speci cation which is likely to behave correctly without the intruder. Then we h a ve used the CADP package to carry out the veri cation. The rst step consists of using the Caesar tool to generate from the LOTOS speci cation a graph called Labelled Transition System (LTS). To be able to generate a nite-state LTS of reasonable size, some limitations were required. The exponential growth of states we meet forces us to limit the user to only one registration and the TTP to only two registrations. This has no e ect on the generality of our result because the intruder is still able to perform a registration aside the user's one.
The size of the resulting graph greatly depends on the version of the protocol we study. The generated LTS of the protocol presented previously was composed of 487446 states and 2944856 transitions. But the corrected version that will be used in section 5.2 raises to 973684 states and 7578109 transitions. All the computations were performed on a Sun Ultra-2 workstation running Solaris 2.5.1 with 2 CPUs and 832 Mb of RAM. The CPU time required for the generation went up to six hours.
The second step in the process consists of using the Aldebaran tool to minimize the resulting graph. The minimization is always done modulo the strong bisimulation equivalence that preserves all the properties of the graph. This phase is generally carried out in less than fteen minutes of CPU time. The reduction factor obtained is very important. The minimized LTS of the rst protocol is made of 3968 states and 37161 transitions. This clearly shows that our biggest problem is the generation of the brute LTS with the Caesar tool.
As we will see in the next section, all the properties we want to verify are safety properties. Thus the minimization could have been improved modulo the safety equivalence which preserves all the properties expressible in Branching time Safety Logic (Bouajjani et al. 1991 ). This was not mandatory because the graphs were already small enough to make the veri cation.
SAFETY PROPERTIES TO BE VERIFIED
Our goal is to verify that the user always correctly authenticates the TTP, t h a t the TTP always correctly authenticates the user and that the TTP receives the right user's public key. W e are going to reach it with the combination of the following safety properties.
P1 : When the TTP successfully registers the user, the user must have started a registration with the TTP before. P2 : When the TTP successfully registers the user, it must have started a registration with this user before. P3 : When the TTP refuses to register the user, it must have started a registration with this user before. This refusal is what we called a failure. P4 : The verdict given by the TTP (i.e. registered or failed) must always be correct and consistent with the acknowledgement received by the user. This property will be further explained below. P5 : The TTP always registers the user with its real public key. Each of these properties can be expressed with the special events managed by the environment. For instance, property P1 is translated to \All TTP_REG_SUCCEEDED with a particular user identi er must be preceded by a USER_START_REG with the same user identi er". This kind of condition can be easily written in the language of our veri cation tools as a reference graph composed of 3 states and 3 transitions.
If we consider the user whose identity i s USERID_A and whose public key is USERPKEY_A, the graph is as follows :
This is a small graph that requires a USER_START_REG event before any TTP_REG_SUCCEEDED event. Property P 1 w i l l b e v eri ed if the LTS of our system where events other than these two have been turned into internal events is related to this LTS by the safety preorder (Bouajjani et al. 1991) . Informally, Property P4 can be best expressed by the graph shown on gure 3. It shows the temporal orderings that we authorize among the TTP_REG_SUCCEEDED, TTP_REG_FAILED, USER_REG_SUCCEEDED and USER_REG_FAILED events. In particular, a USER_REG_SUCCEEDED must always be preceded by o n e TTP_REG_SUCCEEDED because, when the user learns that he has successfully registered, the TTP must have successfully registered him. A USER_REG_FAILED must always be preceded by at least one TTP_REG_FAILED and no TTP_REG_SUCCEEDED because, when the user learns that his registration failed, the TTP must have refused to register him at least once and the TTP must not have registered that user successfully. A USER_REG_FAILED must never follow a TTP_REG_SUCCEEDED.
Properties P1 and P4 achieve the mutual authentication of the user and the TTP. The authentication of the user by the TTP is considered successful only if the TTP registers the user when the user wants to be registered. Thus we need to be sure that the user has started a registration with the TTP when the TTP registers the user. This is provided by property P1. We a l s o n e e d t o be sure that the intruder is unable to perform a new registration of the user. Hence, property P4 allows only one successful registration. The authentication of the TTP by the user is considered successful if the user receives the right response from the TTP. This is guaranteed by p r o p e r t y P 4 .
Properties P2 and P3 ensure that the TTP has really started a registration with the user when he gives a verdict. We need this check because the TTP can manage several registrations simultaneously. Finally, property P 5 e n s u r e s that the user is always registered with its own public key (and not e.g. the intruder's one). To d o s o , t h e TTP_REG_SUCCEEDED event h a s t wo parameters : the user's identity and its public key. We must verify that these two elds always match f o r e v ery TTP_REG_SUCCEEDED event i n t h e L TS of our system.
VERIFICATION OF THE PROTOCOL
This section is the core of our study. W e will show h o w the registration protocol can be certi ed using the Eucalyptus toolbox.
A aw
When checking our properties, Aldebaran discovered that property P 4 w as not satis ed. We use the Exhibitor tool of the CADP package to produce a diagnostic sequence of 19 steps that exhibits one scenario that leads to the undesirable state. This sequence of transitions comprises an event USER_REG_FAILED before an event TTP_REG_SUCCEEDED. Thus the TTP successfully registers the user after the user has learned that his registration failed. This clearly does not ful l property P 4 .
The diagnostic sequence is the following : At line 1, the environment asks for a registration of user A. The user's decoder receives the order and begins the registration with a USER_START_REG event. It sends a register request message to the TTP at step 3 (see section 2.5).
U s e r ! Intruder : Register Request < A K P A fN A gK P T T P >
The intruder intercepts the message and replays it without alteration to the T T P a t l i n e 4 .
Intruder ! T T P : Register Request < A K P A fN A gK P T T P > When the TTP receives this message, he starts the registration and sends back a message 2 with a random numberR 1 at step 6.
T T P ! Intruder : Register Challenge < R 1 fN A gK S T T P >
A corrected version
A w ay to prevent the attack is to add to the acknowledgement a unique identi er of the registration. The random number used in the GQ veri cation is the right candidate. This number is meant to be di erent at each registration. Its integration into the signature of the fourth message will allow the user to check its freshness. Here is the corrected version of our registration protocol :
1 : User ! T T P : Register Request <UserID K P U fngK P T T P > 2 : T T P ! U s e r : Register Challenge < d fngK S T T P > 3 : User ! T T P : Register Response < F (B d) > 4 + : T T P ! U s e r : Register Ack < fY es UserID n dgK S T T P > 4 ; : T T P ! U s e r : Register Ack < fNo UserID n dgK S T T P > Aldebaran states that all our properties are ful lled with this version. Hence, the mutual authentication and the transmission of the public key succeed despite the attempts of the intruder. We conclude that this is a secure registration protocol provided that the cryptographic computations cannot be broken.
The simplest protocol
Section 5.2 demonstrates that the signature of the registration acknowledgement message is very important. It can certainly not be removed as it performs the authentication of the whole registration. We h a ve found that the addition of the random number d in the signature of the fourth message makes the nonce n useless. It was used at rst for the user to authenticate the TTP but the TTP's signature of the acknowledgement is su cient to perform this authentication. The authentication of d with a signature in the registration challenge message is not anymore mandatory. These two simpli cations lead to a very simple protocol with only one signature :
1 : User ! T T P : Register Request <UserID K P U > 2 : T T P ! U s e r : Register Challenge < d > 3 : User ! T T P : Register Response < F (B d) > 4 + : T T P ! U s e r : Register Ack < fY es UserID dgK S T T P > 4 ; : T T P ! U s e r : Register Ack < fNo UserID dgK S T T P > All the ve properties are satis ed. This version is as robust as the previous one from the point of view of the mutual authentication. Obviously, t h e i ntruder can more easily disturb the registration. The only di erence is that the intruder's actions will be discovered later in the protocol. Formally, there exists a safety preorder between the corrected version of the protocol and this simpli ed version regarding the six special events only. Hence the former satis es all safety properties veri ed by the latter.
CONCLUSION
This paper presents a formal description of a security protocol. We h a ve c hosen a protocol that achieves the registration of a user to a trusted third party. W e have shown how complex cryptographic operations can be abstracted away from mathematical details and speci ed by abstract data types. Our model of the Guillou-Quisquater algorithm is particularly simple while still capturing the essence of it. We have shown how intrusions can be taken into account by adding an intruder process. Our model of this intruder is very simple and powerful. He can mimic very easily all reasonable real-world attacks, that is all non cryptographic and non repetitive attacks.
We have shown how to model the security properties, and in particular authentication properties as simple safety properties that can be checked automatically. The veri cation is based on the safety preorder which should hold between the system and the property.
Finally, w e h a ve shown on a concrete protocol how helpful formal description techniques and model-checkers can be to design security protocols. Many subtle attacks were indeed found (such as those provided in this paper) during the design that could probably not have been discovered, at least so early, b y a h uman-being.
The computer aided design aspect of this work has been pushed further in Germeau et al. (1997) where we h a ve made an improvement of the protocol. We s h o w h o w t o g i v e t h e e n tities the ability t o k n o w exactly why a registration does not complete. We w ant t o m a k e a distinction between registration failures due to intruder's actions or due to a genuine user with bad credentials. A new version of the protocol have been designed with the veri cation tools to meet this additional requirement.
The results of the veri cation are obviously based on our set of safety properties and on some assumptions on our model. In particular, we do not prove formally the correctness of our abstract nite model with respect a more realistic model composed of more users and more TTPs. To strengthen our veri cation, it would be interesting to add such a proof, as in Lowe (1996) , but our case-study is more complex. Another possible approach, proposed recently in Bolignano (1997) , is based on an abstraction function and automates the computation of a correct abstract model. Finally, w e do not prove any sort of completeness of our set of safety properties. Methods to automate the de nition of security properties would be desirable. Some work in this direction is proposed in Abadi et al. (1997) .
